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Abstract—In this paper, we study the problem of discovering
multiple resource holders and how to evaluate a node’s satis-
faction in query incentive networks. Utilizing an acyclic tree,
we show that query propagation has a nature of exponential
start, polynomial growth, and eventually becoming a constant.
We model the query propagation as an extensive game, obtain
nodes’ greedy behaviors from Nash equilibrium analysis, and
show the impairment of greedy behaviors via a repeated Pris-
oner’s Dilemma. We demonstrate that cooperation enforcement
is required to achieve the optimal state of resource discovery.
Index Terms—query-incentive network, P2P media streaming,
game theory, resource discovery
I. INTRODUCTION
Incentive has been a popular topic in online question-answer
systems, such as resource query in P2P content-sharing appli-
cations [1] [2], and information seeking in social networking
services [3] [4]. In the literature, incentive mechanisms for
resource discovery have been studied [5] [6] [7], but they only
consider the retrieval of a single resource holder. However, we
may need multiple resource holders in a realistic network [8],
and the conventional mechanisms may not be effective. For
example, peers in P2P multimedia streaming networks need
multiple neighbors to achieve a reasonable streaming rate. In
this work, we study the query propagation and interactions
among nodes for the discovery of multiple resource holders
in query incentive networks, aiming at achieving optimal state
of query propagation and reducing communication overhead
(i.e, the number of query-forwardings in the system).
A. Query process
We dynamically abstract the query propagation as an acyclic
tree, T . Consider a node v∗ in demand of a resource as the
root of T . It sends the query to a subset of its neighbors
and offers a reward, r∗, which it will pay when it finds the
resource. If a child node (i.e., node receiving a query) is not
the resource holder, it checks whether its parent offers a large
enough reward and, if so, propagates the query to a subset of
its neighbors and offers a smaller reward. These neighbors will
handle the query likewise. In this way, the query is propagated
in T until it reaches the resource holders. To prevent redundant
propagation of a query, a node only establishes an edge with
the first node sending it this query and becomes this node’s
child in T .
B. Related work
The recent study in [5] proposes a branching process [9]
model for query incentive networks. The breakpoint structure
and growth rates of rewards are thoroughly analyzed. Along
the same lines, [6] studies the transition behaviors through the
branching process itself and the failure probability. However,
they only consider the scenario of a single resource holder,
and due to the complexity of constructing the generating
functions, the branching process may not be suitable for mod-
eling query propagation in a network with multiple resource
holders. In [7], an incentive mechanism based on subgame
perfect equilibrium (SPE) approximation is demonstrated to
give better performance than breadth-first-search. They show
that the incentive decreases with the number of hops along
the propagation path, thus automatically avoiding the flooding
problem and the pyramid effect. Again, this mechanism only
considers one resource holder. Our study is based on a similar
query propagation model – acyclic tree, and examines the
scenario with multiple resource holders. We also analyze the
system performance w.r.t. the communication overhead.
C. Our contribution
Targeting the discovery of multiple resource holders, we first
conduct an in-depth study of the query propagation pattern in
query incentive networks, based on which we propose a model
to evaluate a node’s satisfaction. By satisfaction we mean
whether a node has enough incentive to propagate a query,
or whether a node can find enough resource holders. Further,
based on the sequential structure of the query propagation,
we model the query propagation as an extensive game, and
study the greedy behaviors of immediate neighbors (i.e, they
may impair the system performance in order to maximize their
own utilities). Our contributions are two-fold:
• We mathematically answer three fundamental questions:
(i) What is the node population growth pattern in the
propagation tree? (ii) How do we evaluate satisfaction
level of different nodes in query incentive networks?
(iii) Can we achieve an optimal state in query incentive
networks?
• Utilizing game theory and mechanism design, we show
that the query propagation reaches a Nash equilibrium
in which immediate neighbors exhibit greedy behaviors.
To illustrate the impairment of greedy behaviors in query
incentive networks, we abstract interactions among im-
mediate neighbors into a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma,
and point out the necessity of cooperation enforcement.
We study the propagation-tree growth pattern and model node
satisfaction in Section II, followed by the game theoretic
analysis in Section III. Then, we present the simulation results
in Section IV, and finally, the conclusion in Section V.
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II. MODELING: TREE GROWTH PATTERN AND NODE
SATISFACTION
In this section, we propose a model to evaluate the satisfac-
tion of a node in the propagation tree. This requires a thorough
understanding of the query propagation process. Thus, we first
study the growth pattern of a propagation tree and then present
the evaluation model.
A. Tree growth pattern
We first look at the discovery success probability. Denote
by N the size of the network. Let p = n|N | be the resource
popularity of a resource c, where n is the number of resource
holders. Suppose that Node v receives a query with offered
reward rv . If it is not the resource holder, it will offer reward
of φv(rv) to its children, which is no larger than rv − Cv,
where Cv is the cost function (e.g., charging for the forwarding
effort). Let φ denote the set of incentive functions {φv(rv) :
v ∈ T }. Suppose v fails to find the resource with probability
 v(φ, rv). Let Tv be the subtree rooted at v in the propagation
tree, and denote by Nv the number of nodes in the subtree,
Tv . Thus the subtree of Tv finds the resource with probability
v(φ, rv) = 1 −  v(φ, rv). To find c, v either holds c or
retrieves resource holders of c through Tv . We can recursively
show that a non-resource holder v fails to find the resource
with probability
 v(φ, rv) = 1− v(φ, rv) =
∏
w∈W
(1− p) w(φ, rw)
= (1 − p)Nv
(1)
where W is the set of node v’s children since only when each
child w of v and each subtree of Tw do not hold the resource,
will the subtree of Tv receive unsuccessful returns. A non-
resource holder v retrieves k resource holders with probability

k
v(φ, rv) =
(
Nv
k
)
pk(1− p)Nv−k. (2)
Based on Eqns. (1) and (2), in the following we explore the
growth pattern of the propagation tree.
PROPOSITION 1. The growth of the node populationNv∗ in
the propagation tree T exhibits the exponential start property
with respect to the depth of the propagation tree.
Proof. Define the overlapping probability pho in the propagating
hop h as the probability of sending a query to nodes receiving
this query already. We assume that the maximum number of
hops in the query propagation is H and the number of nodes
joining the propagation tree in hop h is N(h). Thus, pho is
determined by the number of nodes who have already received
queries, namely,
pho =
∑h−1
h=1 N(h)
|N |
, h = 1, ..., H.
For ease of analysis, we define μ = Nv∗|N | . Obviously,
pho =
∑h−1
h=1 N(h)
|N |
≤ μ, h = 1, ..., H. (3)
Suppose that on average each node in the propagation tree T
sends the query to k of its neighbors. One node in hop h− 1
will further forward the query only if it is not a resource holder
and this is the first time it receives the query. Thus, we obtain
the following recurrence formula:
N(h+ 1) = k(1− p)(1− pho )N(h), h = 1, ..., H (4)
the initial condition of which is N(1) = k(1− p). Combining
Inequality (3) and the above recurrence formula, we obtain
N(h) > k(1− p)(1− μ)N(h− 1)
> N(1)[k(1− p)(1− μ)]h−1
=
[k(1− p)(1− μ)]h
1− μ
.
Thus, the node population in the propagation tree T is
determined by
Nv∗ =
H∑
h=1
N(h)
>
H∑
h=1
[k(1− p)(1− μ)]h
1− μ
=
1
1− μ
(
τH+1
τ − 1
+
τ
1− τ
) ∝ kH ,
when H ≤ H∗ and consequently μ is small enough so that
τ = k(1− p)(1− μ) ≈ k. Hence, the growth of Nv∗ exhibits
exponential start w.r.t. the propagation tree depth H . H∗
is the critical point after which Nv∗ does not exhibit the
exponential start property any more. Denote by Nv∗(x) the
continuous fitting curve of Nv∗ w.r.t. H . Then, H∗ can be
approximated by
∂2Nv∗(x)
∂x2
∣∣
x=H∗
= 0.
B. Node satisfaction evaluation
In a practical network, for example, P2P network, a node
may discover a substantial number of resource holders (es-
pecially for popular resources), and this node only needs a
modest number of resource holders to maintain a satisfactory
downloading or streaming rate. This means that nodes on the
propagation path are not guaranteed to obtain the rewards
offered by the root. This results in two problems, namely,
how to fairly distribute the rewards among these discovered
resource-holding paths, and how to determine whether or not
to forward a query.
Reward division. As offered, the root only pays rewards to
nodes on m resource-holding paths. These paths are chosen
according to the claimed quality of resources offered by
the resource holders. To focus our analysis on the resource
discovery, we simply assume that the root node randomly
chooses m retrieved resource holders with equal probability.
Since we assume m is a constant for a specific network, this
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does not affect our analytical results for the resource discovery
mechanism.
Forwarding decision. Denote by Y the event that a node
finds one resource destination, Z the event that this node
receives rewards as offered. We denote by pr = Prob{Z|Y }
the conditional probability of eventually receiving the offered
rewards. With higher pr, a node has stronger motivation to
further propagate the query. Before we discuss pr, we suppose
that through the discovery mechanism described above the root
node eventually discovers M(r∗, p) resource holders. When
we strive to obtain a statistical and holistic perspective of the
resource discovery, M(r∗, p) is only determined by p and r∗.
In the following, we utilize the conditional probability pr to
evaluate the satisfaction of the resource holders.
DEFINITION 1. The satisfaction index of the retrieved
resource holder is defined as
pr 
{
m
M(r∗,p) , if M(r
∗, p) ≥ m
1, if M(r∗, p) < m
where the conditional probability pr partially reflects one
node’s willingness to retrieve resource destinations for its
parent.
DEFINITION 2. The happiness index of the root is defined
as
ρ 
{
M(r∗,p)
m
, if M(r∗, p) ≤ m
1, if M(r∗, p) > m.
Further, we derive the optimal state as follows.
PROPOSITION 2. Provided that the root node offers strong
enough incentives, for the overall system performance and the
satisfaction of all nodes in the system, the optimal state of
resource discovery is
M(r∗, p) = m.
Proof. This ensures that we do not retrieve redundant resource
holders, thus limiting the propagation overhead to the min-
imum under the condition of providing desirable reliability
for the root node (i.e., ρ = 1). As a result, optimal system
performance is guaranteed. At the same time, the average
reward of each node in the propagation path is maximized
in that the total number of rewards offered by the root node
is not reduced while pr is increased. Therefore, both the root
node and the retrieved resource holders are satisfied according
to indices defined above.
Moreover, how to quantitatively determine M(r∗, p) is
another open problem. The node v in the propagation tree T
broadcasts to a subset of its neighbors with kv nodes. Denote
by δv = kvDv , the relative effort strength of v in helping its
parent. Suppose that nodes in one propagation tree possess
uniform relative effort strength and the same node degree, i.e.,
δv = δ and Dv = D. We contend that M(r∗, p) is linearly
proportional to p in that we consider a randomly formed
neighborhood relationship. However, M(r∗, p)’s marginal in-
crease decreases w.r.t. increasing root node incentive after the
exponential start of Nv∗ , namely, when H > H∗.
In the exponential-start stage of Nv∗ , we model M(r∗, p) as
M(r∗, p) = α(δD)ap (5)
where α > 0 is a weight parameter and a = H is the
exponent determining the marginal increase of M(r∗, p). The
propagation hop H is further determined by the root node
incentive. Then, pr can be reformulated as
pr =
m
α(δD)Hp
when Nv∗ exhibits the exponential-start property. Since H∗
increases w.r.t. decreasing k, we can control pr through both
k and H . When H > H∗, for the exhaustive search of
the network, M(r∗, p) increases in a polynomial form. After
the polynomial growth, the node population becomes constant
since all nodes in the network have been visited.
III. UTILITY-FUNCTION-BASED PROPAGATION
In order to provide incentives for query propagation and
achieve the optimal system performance at the same time, we
establish an extensive game to illustrate the sequential query
propagation and derive the greedy behavior of immediate
neighbors through Nash equilibrium analysis.
A. Game model
We model the propagation process as an extensive game G
because queries are propagated sequentially in the network.
All nodes in the network are players. Let V denote the player
set (|V| is the number of players). S depicts the collection of
strategy sets (S = Sv for ∀v ∈ V). Uv(φ) is the utility of
node v in the propagation tree. We employ node v’s incentive
function φv as the strategic variable, which determines the
propagation hop H and the transmission efforts kv .
LEMMA 1. Denote by X the number of resource holders
retrieved by v. Then,
E(X) = pNv and X ∼ Poisson(μ).
Proof. Each node in the subtree of Tv possesses the resource
with probability p. Let P{X=x} be the probability of x occur-
rences in Nv events and each event occurs with probability
pc < 0.01 [10]. Then, E(X) = pNv and
P{X = x} =
e−pNv(pNv)
x
x!
.
For one retrieved resource, its probability of eventually
receiving the offered rewards rv − φ(rv) is pr. As a result,
the average revenues v obtains from one retrieved resource is
(rv − φ(rv))pr. Therefore, by LEMMA 1, we establish the
utility function of one node v as
Uv(φ) = E(X)(rv − φ(rv))pr − Cv
= pNv(rv − φ(rv))pr − Cv,
where Cv is the cost for query propagation. In the following,
we delve into the property of the Nash equilibrium to arrive
at the greedy behavior of immediate neighbors.
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THEOREM 1. The incentive function profile φ∗ is a Nash
Equilibrium if
φ∗ = argmax
φ
Uv(φ).
Proof. Since each player v’s incentive function is chosen
independently, Uv(φ∗) ≥ Uv(φ∗−v,φ
′
v) for any player v
and for any alternative strategy φ
′
v = φ
∗
v , where φ
∗
−v =
[φ∗1, φ
∗
2, ..., φ
∗
v−1, φ
∗
v+1, . . . , φ
∗
|V|] depicts the composition of
equilibrium strategies of players other than the player v. There-
fore, the steepest gradient ascent of Uv(φ) is the optimized
direction of the evolution of incentive functions. The Nash
Equilibrium φ∗ meets the requirements of no benefits for any
player through unilateral deviations [11].
B. Greedy immediate neighbors
In this section, we study the effect of Nash equilibrium on
immediate neighbors, namely, neighbors of the root node in the
propagation tree. Our goal is to analyze the interactions among
immediate neighbors when they strive to maximize their own
utility. Intuitively, immediate neighbors will offer minimum
incentives to their subtrees and reserve the rest of the rewards.
This results in greedy behavior.
Optimal State Realization. First consider how to achieve
the optimal state as derived in PROPOSITION 2, namely,
M(r∗c , pc) = m, in the presence of greedy immediate neigh-
bors. In realistic networks, nodes may only possess local infor-
mation of the network. Each node strives to optimize its utility
function based on this local information. Thus, the greedy
behavior analysis is scalable since it only involves interactions
among immediate neighbors. In addition, immediate neighbors
analysis epitomizes the nature of interactions among neighbors
in any hop of the propagation.
To achieve the optimal state, statistically each immediate
neighbor of the root node needs to cooperate with each other
to receive equal number of resource destinations as demanded
by the root node. In this way, they increase the probability
of receiving offered rewards eventually, and at the same time
limit the cost of resource retrieval to a minimum. However,
if the root node provides strong enough incentives, then
one immediate neighbor tends to undermine other immediate
neighbors by retrieving more resource holders to increase its
own probability of earning rewards. The interaction among
immediate neighbors turns out to be a repeated game whose
constituent game is the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Prisoner’s Dilemma. We simplify our analysis to the
scenario of two immediate neighbors. Denote by φv∗ the root
node’s incentives. Then, let Player i retrieve mi (i = 1,2)
resources at each round (i.e., each query session). For each
round, provided that the action profile is (m1,m2), Player 1’s
and Player 2’s payoffs are calculated as follows:
u1(m1,m2) = m(φv∗ − φ(m1))
m1
m1 +m2
− C(m1)
u2(m1,m2) = m(φv∗ − φ(m2))
m2
m1 +m2
− C(m2)
where φv∗ is the incentives promised by the root node and
φ(mi) is the rewards given to Play i’s descendants. The above
utility function consists of two terms: the first term denotes
the Bernoulli rewards of Player i w.r.t. the other’s action.
The second term denotes its cost w.r.t. its own action and
we only consider the change of the cost function w.r.t. mi
to lay emphasis on the interactions between the two players
according to changing mi.
Intuitively, if one player does not change its action, the other
can increase its utility by increasing the number of resource
holders it retrieves when the root node’s incentives are strong
enough. The optimal situation is that both nodes retrieve m2
resource holders. Suppose that Player 1 retrieves m2 resource
holders and the root node’s incentives are so strong that Player
2 has incentives to undermine Player 1 by increasing the
number of its retrieved resources, i.e., m2 > m2 . Then, we
have
u1(
m
2
,m2) = m(φv∗ − φ(
m
2
))
m
2
m
2 +m2
− C(
m
2
) < u1(
m
2
,
m
2
),
u2(
m
2
,m2) = m(φv∗ − φ(m2))
m2
m
2 +m2
− C(m2) > u2(
m
2
,
m
2
).
To maximize its utility, Player 2 will increase m2 until the
marginal increase of u2 w.r.t. m2 satisfies ∂u2∂m2
∣∣
m2=m∗
= 0.
Hence, we reach the following definition. For Player i,
by “Cooperation” we mean mi = m2 (denoted by C); by
“Defection” we mean mi = m∗ (denoted by D), where
i ∈ {1,2}. Then, we have
ui(C,C) = ui(m1 =
m
2
,m2 =
m
2
),
ui(D,D) = ui(m1 = m
∗,m2 = m
∗),
u1(C,D) = u2(D,C),
u1(D,C) = u2(C,D),
where u1(D,C) > u1(C,C) > u1(D,D) > u1(C,D).
Cooperation Enforcement. We assume that the neighbor
set of one node is relatively stable in query incentive networks
[5], so that long-term interactions among neighbors can be
formulated. Since each player can deduce the other’s action
through the change of its own rewards, we assume that each
player possesses perfect information about the other player.
Using best response functions [11], we trivially obtain the
unique Nash Equilibrium (D, D). To enforce mutual coopera-
tion, we model the interactions between the two players as an
infinitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma because either player
has no access to the explicit game termination time.
Denote by ati the action of Player i at round t, where
t = 1,2, . . . and i ∈ {1,2}. Let si = (a1i , a2i , . . . ,ati, . . .) be
Player i’s strategy and S = (s1,s2), the strategy profile. We
treat payoffs at different rounds symmetrically, namely, the
preference relations are established using the form of limit of
means:
Ui(S) = lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
ui(S).
According to the Perfect Folk Theorem for the Limit of Means
Criterion [11], every feasible strictly enforceable payoff profile
is a subgame perfect equilibrium payoff profile of the limit of
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means infinitely repeated game. Cooperation can be achieved
through strategies of threats of punishment. That is, if one node
defects, the other will punish it via defection for a substantial
number of rounds [11]. Detailed mechanism is not discussed
here due to limited space.
IV. SIMULATION
Through simulation, we look at the effects of greedy be-
haviors on communication overhead, and investigate whether
a root can obtain enough resource holders. We validate the
growth pattern derived in Section II, and demonstrate the
necessity to contain greedy behaviors in the system.
Incentive function only affects the relationships between the
reward and the propagation depth, and does not affect our
results. Thus, we assume that each node reserves one unit
of reward when propagating the query to the next one. We
utilize a random graph of 104 nodes with average degree being
30. This setting is similar to PPLive [12] overlay structures.
Different resource popularities are deployed according to [10],
and for each popularity we randomly choose 100 nodes as root.
We also assume that a root need m = 10 resource holders to
maintain a satisfaction (e.g. streaming or downloading quality
in P2P networks). We compare the performance in a system
with greedy immediate neighbors and that without greedy
behaviors (i.e., cooperation is enforced).
Figure 1 presents the average number of retrieved resource
holders and the happiness indices of root nodes. Figure 1(a)
validates our analysis that the propagation tree goes through
exponential start, polynomial growth, and eventually converges
to a constant (PROPOSITION 1). As compared with Fig-
ure 1(a), Figure 1(b) shows that the happiness indices are
approximately equal despite the decrease of the number of
retrieved resource holders when cooperation among immediate
neighbors is enforced.
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Figure 1. Comparison of Happiness Indices.
Figure 2 present the communication overhead. We can
clearly see that, when p = 0.001, systems with greedy im-
mediate neighbors do not outperform systems without greedy
behaviors. This is because the number of retrieved resource
holders is less than the root’s expectation. However, when
p > 0.001, the communication overhead is obviously lower in
systems without greedy behaviors. Therefore, by cooperation
enforcement, we succeed in limiting communication overhead
while achieving the optimal state.
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Figure 2. Comparison of Communication Overhead.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we study the problem of discovering multiple
resource holders and how to evaluate a node’s satisfaction in
query incentive networks. We conduct an in-depth analysis
of the query propagation pattern. We also model the query
propagation as an extensive game, and study the greedy
behaviors of immediate neighbors. We demonstrate that co-
operation enforcement is required to achieve the optimal state
of resource discovery. In the future, we would like to study
the relationships between incentives and transmission efforts,
the trust management among neighbors [13], and the coalition
formulation of this problem.
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